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Abstract
Cities are a big source of spatio-temporal data that
is shared across entities to drive potential use cases.
Many of the Spatio-temporal datasets are confiden-
tial and are selectively shared. To allow selective
sharing, several access control models exist, how-
ever user cannot express arbitrary space and time
constraints on data attributes using them. In this
paper we focus on spatio-temporal access control
model. We show that location and time attributes
of data may decide its confidentiality via a motivat-
ing example and thus can affect user’s access con-
trol policy. In this paper, we present StreetX which
enables user to represent constraints on multiple ar-
bitrary space regions and time windows using a sim-
ple abstract language. StreetX is scalable and is de-
signed to handle large amount of spatio-temporal
data from multiple users. Multiple space and time
constraints can affect performance of the query and
may also result in conflicts. StreetX automatically
resolve conflicts and optimizes the query evaluation
with access control to improve performance. We
implemented and tested prototype of StreetX using
space constraints by defining region having 1749
polygon coordinates on 10 million data records. Our
testing shows that StreetX extends the current ac-
cess control with spatio-temporal capabilities.
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1 Introduction
Individuals, organizations and different sectors of
city generate spatio-temporal data having volume,
variety, velocity and value. Few examples of such
datasets include New York City taxi data with over
1.1 billion taxi trips [14], location tracking data of
individuals, satellite data from NASA that produces
4TB of new data everyday [13], Los Angeles city
traffic data [9] and water data of 1.5 million sites
[16]. These datasets has potential to create innova-
tive applications which encourage cities to collect
more data. For example traffic and crash datasets
are used together to predict safety of roads [22].
To amplify usability, datasets are shared, stored
and transformed by different entities. For instance,
acute respiratory syndrome disease was controlled
by the efforts of World Heath Organization only
within 4 months after its emergence using extensive
data sharing [20]. Several open data portals give
public access to city information [8, 17]. But some
datasets are confidential and are only shared with
authorized entities or shared partly. For example,
the health department may share confidential data
with law enforcement agencies.
We focus on the space and time attributes of data
to define access control policy. Space and time at-
tributes often decide the privacy and confidentiality
of data. For example, let us consider Alice who is
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participating in a health study. During the study she
monitors her multiple vitals and location for several
days while doing normal daily activities. Bob is in-
terested in health information of Alice for his re-
search. Alice is willing to share her data so as to
understand her health problems better. But Alice
wants selective data sharing with Bob according to
her privacy needs. She wants to share her data when
she is within Los Angeles excluding her home and
only during working hours with a hourly time reso-
lution. Alice also wants Bob to not share her data
further. In order to restrict access to data differ-
ent types of access control models exist, but they
lack support to specify spatio-temporal constraints
on data attributes. Thus, Alice cannot express her
desired access control using earlier models. Alice
may have to create and share subset of her data man-
ually.
Access control based on space and time attributes
restricts data at confidential locations and periods.
Controlling the resolution of data limits the appli-
cation usability and ability of a user to extract sen-
sitive information. Data sharing policies affect the
capabilities of user to share data further and thus
can control data dissemination. However, providing
spatio-temporal access control on large datasets is
not trivial. Multiple arbitrary space and time con-
straints may result in conflicts and can also severely
penalize the performance of the system. Thus it re-
quire conflict resolution strategies and policy opti-
mization techniques.
In this paper, we present StreetX which pro-
vides simple language to specify multiple arbi-
trary constraints on space and time attributes and
data sharing policies. StreetX policy language
present constraints in human understandable seman-
tics. StreetX automatically resolves conflicting ac-
cess control policies and uses optimization strate-
gies when applying policies on user queries. We
show that using StreetX, Alice can easily express
her access control policy for Bob. To evaluate the
proposed access control model, we implemented
and tested a prototype of StreetX to evaluate ran-
dom user query along with space constraints spec-
ified using polygon of latitude and longitude hav-
ing 1749 coordinates on 10 Million spatio-temporal
data records. StreetX filters user queries using pol-
icy constraints and does query evaluation in 72 mil-
liseconds on an average.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: in section 2 we discuss the related work;
section 3 introduces the StreetX model; section 4
discusses access control and language. section 5
presents StreetX architecture and implementation
details; section 6 gives evaluation and testing re-
sults; finally, in section 7 we conclude and point to
future works.
2 Related Work
In this section, we survey access control models,
policy definitions and related systems and illustrate
that none of these support multiple arbitrary spatio-
temporal constraints on data attributes. In order
to control the granularity of access control many
techniques have been proposed. Traditional mod-
els such as Role-Based Access Control [30] and
Attribute-Based Access Control [21] are used exten-
sively. Role-Based Access Control regulates access
based on the role of individual user. User’s role is
associated with privileges and functions which user
can perform. Attribute-Based Access Control uses
attributes of user, data, context or action to restrict
access. Multiple extensions to Role-Based Access
Control using user’s space and time context are pro-
posed by researchers. For example TRBAC [18] ac-
tivates user roles at certain time periods and LRBAC
[27] controls user privileges based on her physical
location. There are similar works [24, 29, 32, 28]
where user’s role gets activated based on location or
time of user requesting access to resource. However
they don’t consider the space and time attributes
of datasets to define spatio-temporal access control.
PlexC [23] is a policy language designed for expo-
sure control of data by allowing users to define ac-
cess control policies based on different roles, dis-
closure level, time and location rules based on user
context. PlexC doesn’t consider multiple space re-
gions and time windows on data attributes.
PDVLoc [25] is designed for location based mo-
bile services using which individual user can con-
trol location data sharing. PDVLoc is an individual
data store with fine granular access control, policy
recommendation and trace audit. PDVLoc supports
space policies based on circular range. SensorSafe
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[19] also provides fine granular access control with
major focus on privacy rules and data obfuscation
techniques. It allows single space region definition
in access control. Both SensorSafe and PDVLoc
have no support for multiple arbitrary space bound-
aries, time windows and data sharing policies.
Cell level access control also exists in databases
like Apache Hbase [2] and Apache Accumulo [1].
In Accumulo and Hbase each data cell can be asso-
ciated with a label which can be later used to selec-
tively control data access. Along with support for
simple labels, logical AND and OR operations on
labels are also supported. However these databases
don’t support spatio-temporal access control. Ar-
cGIS [3] is an industry standard geographic infor-
mation system, but it only supports Role-Based Ac-
cess Control model. Data sharing policies are ex-
plored by attaching policies with data by Saroiu et
al [31]. Every time an organization request access
to the user’s data, it has to explicitly acknowledge
the user policy however, policies are not enforce.
Organization may later misuse the data against the
sharing policy which may have legal consequences.
We extend the idea to specify data sharing policies
along with spatio-temporal access control. How-
ever, StreetX doesn’t enforce the data sharing poli-
cies.
Collectively, these systems represent an effort
to develop fine granular access control. However,
no system allows multiple arbitrary constraints on
space and time attributes of data in a multi-user set-
ting which require expressible language model, con-
flict resolution and query optimization techniques.
Also handling handling large datasets require dis-
tributed architecture to be scalable.
3 StreetX Model
StreetX serves as a data hub for spatio-temporal
data belonging to different entities. Streetx allows
data owner to define fine granular spatio-temporal
access control based on data attributes and speci-
fying data sharing policies. Heterogeneous spatio-
temporal datasets are transformed into a collection
of data streams. Each data stream has an owner
which specifies the access control policy and data
sharing policy for other users. Both owners and
users can query the data streams to which they have
access to. StreetX supports rich spatio-temporal
query across multiple data streams. While evaluat-
ing each query StreetX makes sure that the access
control policy associated with the individual data
stream is respected. Below we define the concept of
data stream, owner, user and policy in our system.
Data Stream: Data Stream uniquely identifies
the type of data. For example we may have two data
streams one for the temperature sensor and other
for the accelerometer sensor. A dataset with mul-
tiple measurements can be transformed into multi-
ple data streams, one for each measurement. Each
data stream consists of (latitude, longitude, time,
value) and is uniquely identified by a data stream
id (di). The set of data streams in the system is
D= {d1, ...,dn}.
Owner: Every data stream has an owner. Owner
is the entity who has created the data stream and has
added data into it. Owner may own multiple data
streams. Owner is the one which control the access
and data sharing policies of the data stream. Owner
creates policies for users with whom she wants to
share her data stream. For simplicity we consider a
data stream can have only one owner and ownership
cannot be transfered. Every owner is uniquely iden-
tified by an owner id (oi). The set of owners in the
system is O= {o1, ...,om}.
User: User is the entity interested to use the data
stream of owner. User can query the data stream,
during which the owner policies defined on the data
stream for the user are respected. A user may have
access to several data streams and can query them
simultaneously. In case user is the owner of the data
stream, her query is answered directly. Every user
is uniquely identified by a user id (ui). The set of
users in the system is U = {u1, ...,ul}. The set of
owners (O) is a subset of the set of users (U).
Policy: Policy defines the access of user to the
data stream. There are two types of policies which
we consider in StreetX: access control policy and
data sharing policy. Access control policy is speci-
fied in terms of space and time attributes of the data
stream. Access control policy can also affect the
resolution of space and time attributes of data. Data
sharing policy defines the sharing capabilities of the
user for the data. Owner may define multiple poli-
cies on her data streams for same user. Every policy
3
is uniquely identified by a policy id (pi). The set of
policies in the system is P= {p1, ..., pr}.
4 Policy & Language
StreetX has two different types of policies: Access
control policies and data sharing policies. StreetX
policy definitions are using abstract language con-
structs presented in Table 1. In Table 1, the What
Constructs Meaning & Examples
What Specifies the set of data streams
on which policies are defined using
data stream ids. Eg: What(d1, d2)
Where Specifies the multiple semantic
space regions along with a
optional NOT keyword to
represent exclusion.
Eg: Where(LA, NOT HOME)
When Specifies the multiple semantic
windows of time along with a
optional NOT keyword to
represent exclusion.
Eg: When(WorkingHours,
“11/1/2016-11/31/2016”)
How Specifies the resolution restrictions
on space and time. Resolution
keywords are reserved.
Eg: How(Hour, ZipCode)
Whom Specifies the set of users to whom
this policy applies using user ids.
Eg: Whom(u1, u2)
Who Specifies the data sharing policy
of owner using reserved keywords.
Eg: Who(DenyDataSharing)
Table 1: Policy Language
construct select the set of data streams on which the
policy is being applied and the Whom construct se-
lects the set of users whose access control is affected
by the policy. Any policy at minimum must have
What and Whom constructs. The Where, When and
How constructs are defining the access control pol-
icy based on space and time attributes of data, which
is detailed in the Section 4.2. The Who construct
defines the data sharing policy explained in Section
4.3. In Where construct, union and exclusion of dif-
ferent space regions can be defined and similar is
allowed with time windows in When construct.
4.1 User Defined & Language Keywords
Table 1 shows a subset of keywords used in our
language. There are two types of keywords: user
defined keywords and language reserved keywords.
The user defined keywords are used in Where and
When constructs to define space regions and time
windows. For example the LA, HOME and Work-
ingHours are user defined keywords in Table 1. We
assume that in future, keywords can be defined us-
ing graphical user interface extension to StreetX,
which allows uploading GeoJSON [5] definitions of
regions and specify time constraints. GeoJSON can
be used to define arbitrarily complex space region.
The language reserved keyword NOT can be used
in Where and When constructs to exclude a particu-
lar space region or time window. The sample user
keyword definitions are shown in Table 2.
Keywords Definitions
HOME {“Name”:“HOME”,“Type”:
“Where”,“Polygon”:[{lat1,lng1}
,{lat2,lng2},...,{lat1,lng1}]}
WorkingHours {“Name”:“WorkingHours”,
“Type”:“When”,“RepeatedHour”
:“9AM-5PM”,“ExcludeDay”:
[“saturday”,“sunday”]}
Table 2: User Defined Keywords
The language reserved keywords to specify the
resolution in How construct and data sharing policy
specification in Who construct are shown in Table
3.
Construct Keywords
How:Time Second, Minute, Hour, Day,
Week, Month, Year.
How:Space ZipCodes, County, City, Country.
Who AllowDataSharing,
DenyDataSharing,
PolicyUpdateEffect.
Table 3: Language Keywords
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4.2 Access Control Policy
Access control policy can be specified using the ab-
stract language constructs which are shown in Table
1. The constructs are very near to the user’s nat-
ural language and uses semantic keywords. Look-
ing back to our previous example of Alice and Bob,
where Alice wanted to selectively share her histori-
cal health data with Bob. The access control policy
to specify the space within Los Angeles excluding
the home, during the working hours and with hourly
resolution can be defined by Alice using Equation
1, where dh identifies the health data stream of Al-
ice, and ub identifies the user Bob. The HOME and
WorkingHour keywords are defined in Table 2. Sim-
ilarly LA keyword can also be defined.
What(dh).Where(LA, NOT HOME).
When(WorkingHours).How(Hour).Whom(ub)
(1)
4.3 Data Sharing Policy
Owner can specify data sharing policy in the
Who construct described in Table 1 using the
language reserved keywords defined in Table 3.
Who(AllowDataSharing) specifies that owner has
allowed data sharing. The data shared by the user
is at the resolution specified by the How construct.
Who(AllowDataSharing,PolicyUpdateEffect) speci-
fies that data sharing is allowed by owner, but in
future owner may change the policy to deny, and all
the data shared by the user to multiple other enti-
ties will not be available to them. PolicyUpdateEf-
fect controls the effect of policy update by owner on
multi-hop sharing. Who(DenyDataSharing) speci-
fies that data sharing is not allowed. StreetX al-
lows owner to specify data sharing policies which
are informed to users. Violating these policies may
have legal consequences. However StreetX doesn’t
enforces the data sharing policies. The data shar-
ing policies affect both raw data and processed data.
We didn’t separate this because user may use iden-
tity function on the raw data stream to replicate it
or may encrypt the raw data stream values which
might be used to regenerated raw data stream later.
In our previous example, the final policy of Alice for
Bob along with specified data sharing is expressed
in Equation 2.
What(dh).Where(LA, NOT HOME).
When(WorkingHours).How(Hour).Whom(ub)
.Who(DenyDataSharing)
(2)
Distributed Database
Spatio-Temporal Layer
Policy Definition Policy Conflict Resolution Query
Policy 
Application Data IngestionPolicy Metadata
Access Control and Data Management Layer
Owner User/Application
API Layer
Figure 1: System Architecture
4.4 StreetX Workflow
In order to understand the workflow of StreetX, let
us consider our earlier example of Alice and Bob.
Alice defines a data stream dh and uploads her en-
tire health data. She defines keywords mentioned in
Table 2 and creates a policy shown in Equation 1 for
user Bob identified by ub. Now, Bob can query Al-
ice data, however data exposed to Bob is controlled
by the policy of Alice. Our assumption is that health
data of Alice is defined by only one data stream. She
may define different data stream for each heath mea-
surement type and can define access control policies
on set of data stream. Suppose later Alice discov-
ered that, her data within UCLA campus contains
some confidential information, she can update her
policy for Bob to hide her data while she is in UCLA
campus and also keep the previous policy constrains
as shown in Equation 3. StreetX allows Alice to de-
fine and update her policy easily.
What(dh).Where(LA, NOT HOME, NOT
UCLA).When(WorkingHours).How(Hour)
.Whom(ub).Who(DenyDataSharing)
(3)
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5 StreetX Architecture & Implementation
StreetX architecture is shown in Figure 1. Dis-
tributed Database is used for scalability and per-
formance reasons. Distributed Database stores the
data streams, metadata defining the owners, users
and policies. Spatio-Temporal layer provides the
capabilities which are used to enforce the access
control policies based on space and time. Access
Control and Data Management layer have multi-
ple components. Data Ingestion module is used
to ingest spatio-temporal data into the Distributed
Database. Policy Definition module provides ab-
stract language constructs presented in Table 1 and
keywords definition support discussed in section
4.1. Policy Metadata module manages the informa-
tion about policies, owners, data streams and users
affected by policies. Query module is used by own-
ers and users to query the spatio-temporal data to
which they have access to. Query module uses in-
formation from Policy Metadata module to identify
the set of relevant policies for a particular query.
The conflicts in the policies if any are resolved by
the Policy Conflict Resolution module. The policies
are applied by Policy Application module which
translate the user query along with extra constraints
introduced due to the policies into a spatio-temporal
query. This transformed query is now evaluated by
the Spatio-temporal layer. The API Layer exposes
the functionality of StreetX to authenticated owners
and users.
We implemented a prototype of StreetX in
Java. We used Apache HBase [2] for Distributed
Database layer. Apache HBase is an open-source
NoSQL scalable distributed database. Apache
HBase stores the spatio-temporal data streams, and
metadata. We use GeoMesa [6] as spatio-temporal
layer on top of Apache HBase. GeoMesa is open
source suite of tools that provide geospatial ana-
lytics support for spatio-temporal data. GeoMesa
supports Common Query Language [4] which of-
fers geospatial, temporal and attribute operators.
5.1 Data Ingestion & Query
Data Ingestion module allows owner to push data
into StreetX. StreetX supports the ingestion of
spatio-temporal data expressed in the form of data
streams. The data ingestion module inserts data into
Apache HBase. Query module exposes data streams
to user. StreetX implementation supports spatio-
temporal query on arbitrary set of data streams via
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [7] format pre-
sented in Representation 1.
{"userId ":ub,"DsID ":[d1,...,di],
"SpaceBox ":[latmin,latmax,lngmin,lngmax],
"TimeRange ":[TimeStampmin,TimeStampmax]}
Representation 1: User Query
5.2 Policy Application
Policy Application module of Figure 1 translates the
policy into constraints on space and time attributes
of data. Policy Application module also performs
the required computation for controlling resolution,
which is discussed in Section 5.4. For example to
apply policy of Alice specified in Equation 2, we
translate the policy to respective space and time
constraints in JSON using keyword definitions of
Table 2. The sample output of translation of Equa-
tion 2 is shown in Representation 2. In order to
translate WorkingHours, we use the meta data of
data stream dh to know the start time and end time
of data and create time windows of daily working
hours in UNIX timestamps excluding Saturdays and
Sundays. Visualizing the space region for this pol-
icy may look as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, we
have shown only 2 regions for simplicity, but policy
language can express multiple arbitrary regions.
{"Space ":{"Allow":[{"Keyword":"LA",
"Polygon":[{"lat":lati1,"lng":lngi1},
..]}],"Deny":"[{"Keyword":"HOME",
Polygon:[{"lat":lat j1,"lng":lngi1},
..]}]},
"Time ":[{"Keyword":"WorkingHours",
Allow:[{"start:":t1,"end":t2},..]}]}
Representation 2: Space and Time Constraints
User query presented in Representation 1 and
policy translation presented in Representation 2 are
further translated into the effective set of constraints
for evaluation. The constraints can be grouped into
set of space polygons and set of time windows
for each data stream. For simplicity if we con-
sider a single data stream, the final effective con-
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LA Region
HOME Region
Figure 2: Space Region for Translation 1. Showing
a subset of Los Angeles (LA) Region having 1749
coordinates in blue and definition of HOME Region
using bounding box with 4 coordinates highlighted
by red markers.
straint translation is presented in Representation 3.
Here {Rqb}QuerySpaceBOX and {T1,T2}QueryTimeRange
are from user query (here Bob). {RLA}SpacePolicy,
{RHOME}SpacePolicy and {Ti−1,Ti}QueryTimeRange are
from access control policy of Alice given in Equa-
tion 1. In prototype implementation, StreetX al-
lows the policy constraints expressed in Represen-
tation 2. We plan to extend it with the proposed
language constructs in future. Representation 3
can be directly translated into Common Query Lan-
guage supported by by GeoMesa, however it may
adversely affect the performance. We use query op-
timization strategies discussed in Section 5.3 to im-
prove the query evaluation time.
{"Space ":{{Rqb}QuerySpaceBOX AND
{{RLA}SpacePolicy AND {NOT RHOME}SpacePolicy}},
"Time ":[{Tmin,Tmax}QueryTimeRange AND
{{T1,T2}QueryTimeRange,... AND {Tn−1,Tn}}]
Representation 3: Example Final Effective Con-
straints
5.3 Query Optimization
Final access control constraints shown in Repre-
sentation 3 can affect the query evaluation perfor-
mance. In our testing discussed in Section 6, con-
sidering the direct user query on data stream without
access control as baseline. The performance is de-
graded by a factor of 4 times due to access control
constraints of Figure 2 even though less number of
data points are fetched. We reject the user query
and return 0 results if it cannot be satisfied by look-
ing at all the constraints. In order to do this, we
check the satisfiability of Representation 3 to see if
user query intersects the allowed space regions and
time windows specified by policy. For example, to
checking the satisfiability of spatial constraints in
Representation 3, we do the spatial query to see if
{Rqb}QuerySpaceBOX intersects {RLA}SpacePolicy and is
not completely within {RHOME}SpacePolicy. StreetX
keeps policy constraints in memory and applies
them to every query before translating it and eval-
uating using GeoMesa. If, we directly evaluate an
unsatisfiable query on GeoMesa, it will still return 0
results, but takes significantly more time which af-
fects query performance as discussed in Section 6.
In future, We also plan to group together the simi-
lar constraints because complexity of contraints di-
rectly affect the performance as discussed in Section
6. For example, two space regions can be grouped
together, if one of them is completely within the
other.
5.4 Space & Time Resolution
StreetX handles resolution constraints on a partic-
ular data stream by creating a separate data stream
with the required resolution. For example, to imple-
ment the hourly resolution, we convert all the time
values within an hour to the same value, making
them indistinguishable in time attribute, the similar
concept is extended to space attribute. For spatial
resolution, we assume the availability of required
spatial boundaries. StreetX redirects all the user
queries to new data stream which is not exposed to
owner directly and exists only if resolution policy is
defined by the Owner. Other approach is to create
resolution on the fly from original data stream after
doing the query. It will require processing of time
and location values for every record in the result
set and may also discard some of the records, be-
cause resolution can also affect the number of points
fetched. We didn’t use this approach due to perfor-
mance reason, however replicating data stream uses
extra storage. In prototype implementation, StreetX
assumes the data stream with desired resolution.
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5.5 Policy Conflict Resolution
Policy Conflict Resolution module identifies con-
flicting policies at the time of policy definition. Al-
lowing multiple space and time restrictions may re-
sult in conflicts. Conflict happens when multiple
policies exist for the same user defined over the
same data stream. Three different scenario’s in con-
flict are possible: Firstly, When either the space re-
gions or time windows from different policies don’t
overlap with each other. Such a scenario is ex-
plained in Figure 3, where policy P1, P2, P3, P4
and P5 have space region constraints of type allow.
In this case, union of all policies is followed , even
though their time windows may overlap. In such
conflicts, multiple policies are defined over different
subsets of data within data stream and thus are not
really conflicting in terms of constraints, a union of
policies is followed by doing union on all the con-
straints.
Second scenario happens when both space re-
gions and time windows of different policies over-
lap, which means both are defined over same set
of data within data stream. Consider for example
two policies P1 and P2 where space region and time
windows of both policies overlap. For simplicity,
consider space regions are as shown in Figure 4 and
time windows are exactly same for both policies. In
this case, StreetX follows the principle of least priv-
ilege while doing union of policies. StreetX gives
high priority to the constraints denying space re-
gions and time windows.
A third scenario which requires special treatment
is an extension to second scenario. It happens when
policies have different resolutions. For example,
consider the Figure 4. If policy P1 and policy P2
have different resolution, then enforcing resolution
constraints is a challenge. Currently, StreetX create
different data streams for policy P1 and Policy P2,
if they have different resolution. This will require
StreetX to subdivide the query and use resolution
of P1 for R1 and resolution of P2 for R2. But for
R3, decision cannot be simply made based on prin-
ciple of least privilege because two different resolu-
tions may not be comparable sometime. For exam-
ple, resolution based on time cannot be compared
with resolution based on space. StreetX model can-
not resolve the third scenario completely without at-
taching priorities with policies. We have not imple-
mented Policy Conflict Resolution module in proto-
type of StreetX. We assume that all the desired con-
straints are already grouped together by following
union of policies and are expressed in Representa-
tion 2.
P1 P3
P4
P5P2
Figure 3: Non-Overlapping Space Regions for Dif-
ferent Policies.
P2P1
R1 R2R3
Figure 4: Overlapping Space Region for Policy P1
and Policy P2.
6 Evaluation and Testing
We deployed prototype of StreetX on a single in-
stance of Microsoft Azure [12] DS4 V2 having 8
cores and 28GB RAM on Ubuntu Server 16.04 us-
ing HBase v1.2.5. We tested the performance of
StreetX in applying space policy constraint using a
region shown in Figure 2, having 7649 coordinates
extracted from the website of Los Angeles County
Department of Public Works [15]. The policy defi-
nition used in this testing is shown in Equation 4.
What(d).Where(LA, NOT HOME).Whom(u) (4)
The LA space region has a complex shape as
shown in Figure 2 which is roughly 5,000 km2. Ta-
ble 3 presents summary of testing. A data stream
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having 10 Million points was generated randomly
with location variation in an area A of 500 KM by
500 KM around Los Angeles and time variation T
of 1 year between 2014 to 2015. User query is gen-
erated randomly in the format shown in Representa-
tion 1 using a spacebox of 50KM by 50KM within
A and timerange of 2 weeks within T . Three dif-
ferent types of queries are performed as shown in
Table 3. The results presented are the average of
1000 user queries. Queryd is direct user query with-
out any policy application. It gives the baseline for
number of points fetched with no space restrictions
and performance time. Querya is user query evalu-
ated along with policy of Equation 4 without opti-
mizations discussed in Section 5.3. Queryb is user
query evaluated along with policy of Equation 4 and
optimizations discussed in Section 5.3.
Dataset Query No. of points Time (ms)
10 Million Queryd 5230 540
10 Million Querya 202 2325
10 Million Queryb 202 72
Table 4: StreetX Testing
Queryd serves as a baseline when user query is
evaluated without any policy. As expected with
policy restrictions the number of points fetched de-
creased from 5230 to 202 in Querya and Queryb.
But Querya takes 4 times more time then even
Queryd though it retrieves less points. This ex-
tra time is due to the complex space policy restric-
tions. Queryb takes only 72 milliseconds to evaluate
on an average. The reason behind this is rejection
of the queries which cannot be satisfied by Policy
Application module without evaluating them using
GeoMesa. In our experiments of generating 1000
random user queries, 900 queries were rejected by
Policy Application module using optimizations dis-
cussed in Section 5.3. Queryb also keeps the poli-
cies in memory which does the language transla-
tion faster. In order to understand the effect of
number of coordinates in space constraint, we per-
formed Querya and Queryb by decreasing the num-
ber of coordinates in LA space region from 7649
by 3 times to 2550 by random selection. The re-
sults are shown in Table 5, which depict the effect
of size of constraints on performance. The results
indicate that user should express the resolution of
space boundary with the least possible number of
coordinates. The increase in performance of Querya
is more than 6 times whereas for Queryb it is less,
which is because Queryb is already optimized. Our
results show that StreetX can express and evalu-
ate complex spatio-temporal access control policies
over large datasets.
Dataset Query No. of points Time (ms)
10 Million Querya 258 345
10 Million Queryb 258 63
Table 5: StreetX Testing With 2550 Space Con-
straint Coordinates
7 Conclusions & Future Works
In this paper, we presented StreetX to enhance ac-
cess control capabilities with fine granular con-
straints on space and time attributes of data. StreetX
serves novel applications by allowing selective data
sharing based on confidential locations and time pe-
riods using simple abstract language. One such
evaluation was presented by us where space policy
was defined using complex space region. Arbitrary
spatio-temporal constraints may result in conflicts
which are handled by StreetX. StreetX also uses
query optimization strategies which enhance perfor-
mance significantly. Our evaluation shows StreetX
is scalable and can represent and evaluate arbitrary
spatio-temporal policies over large datasets in an
optimized manner.
In future, we plan to implement all the proposed
features and do further testing of StreetX by evalu-
ating it using real spatio-temporal datasets. We plan
to integrate StreetX with city scale data hub projects
like MetroInsight [11] and health data hub initia-
tives like MD2K [10] to enhance data sharing of real
systems. Different extensions to StreetX are possi-
ble, like allowing users to specify policies in natu-
ral language and built in support for general shape
definitions of cities, counties etc. We also plan to
explore use of trusted computing platforms [26] to
enforce data sharing policies.
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